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ABSTRACT 
The United States Navy (USN) as well as other allied naval forces deploy 
their ships worldwide to support and conduct various maritime missions ranging 
from humanitarian aid to combat. In order to accomplish these missions and 
maintain a sustained deployment it is paramount to establish a robust means of 
logistic support. We present two operational planning tools to respectively plan 
Combat Logistics Force shuttle ship schedules to simultaneously support all U.S. 
Navy operating ships worldwide, and a Navy Mission Planner with new logistics 
features to decide where combatants should locate to perform their missions in a 
particular area of operations, and how to arrange logistics support of these 
combatants. These operational decision aids use optimization to suggest 
alternate courses of action for operational and logistics planners to consider.  We 
discuss how the former model has been used by U.S. 2nd Fleet in their exercise 
Trident Warrior 09. We additionally present a face valid scenario for the Navy 
Mission planner showing different planning results when logistics are 
incorporated into the planning process. 
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Maritime operational planning must synchronize various threads and 
combine them into an integrated operating plan. The maritime force commander 
and his planning staff have to devote a large amount of time to evaluate all these 
different threads in parallel and organize them prior to employing resources into 
theater. Usually, the planning staff uses un-automated processes to keep track of 
the various input factors ranging from the simple organization of the area of 
operations into different regions to synchronized time-phased allocation of forces 
to accomplish various missions over the entire spectrum. 
We present two decision aids, the Combat Logistic Force (CLF) planner 
and the Navy Mission Planner (NMP), that use integer linear programming to 
support the planning staff and yield provable, mathematically optimal results. 
Both presented models use different approaches to solve the given problems. 
The CLF planner was originally a strategic planning tool seeking optimal 
deployment schedules to support combat operations based on multiple battle 
groups (BG) worldwide. It uses integer linear programming to evaluate where 
and when supply ships may be prepositioned in order to replenish BGs en route. 
Thereby, it uses a given operational plan represented by exogenous BG 
navigational tracks. We add enhanced features to the decision aid enabling 
operational planning. The CLF planner is implemented in a Microsoft Excel 
graphical user interface that provides access to all important features such as an 
animation feature, a saw-tooth diagram, and a collection of maps visualizing 
common operating areas. 
NMP originally was a purely operational decision aid that uses constrained 
enumeration to generate near-optimal employment schedules for surface combat 
ships to accomplish required missions in a confined area of operations. We add 
the possibility to also evaluate employment schedules for logistic ships 
supporting the combat ships. The decision aid is implemented in an Excel 
 xviii
spreadsheet that uses Visual Basic to enumerate candidate employment 
schedules for both combat ships and supply ships. The new logistics feature 
includes a saw-tooth diagram to illustrate the daily inventory of the four main 
commodity groups for each individual ship. Furthermore, we include the 
capability to enable escort and close escort missions. 
CLF and NMP are very flexible and can support almost any scenario, and 
produce feasible and provably optimal solutions to scheduling problems. Both 
decision aids expedite the evaluation of possible courses of action, and produce 
better results than manual planning. The enhanced CLF planner is currently 
under evaluation by U.S. 2nd Fleet and NWDC in the command and control 
exercise Trident Warrior 2009.  
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The United States Navy (USN) as well as other naval forces deploy their 
ships all around the globe to conduct and support various maritime missions 
ranging from humanitarian aid to combat. In order to accomplish these missions 
and maintain a sustained presence within an area of operations (AOO), it is 
paramount to establish a robust means of logistic support.  
A logistic network can take several forms and can function in several 
ways. Support for individual ships in smaller scenarios may be established by 
using civilian port facilities for direct support such as refueling, disposing, and 
restocking with perishable goods, as well as all other means of transportation in 
order to supply units with urgent needs wherever they make berth. However, this 
might only be a suitable solution when we do not face possible hostilities within 
the designated operating area. 
If a maritime mission is conducted to enforce political will, e.g., a United 
Nations Security Council Resolution, it might become necessary to establish the 
logistic network by purely military means. In order to achieve the highest level of 
sustainment for current operations, it is mandatory to find the right mix of logistic 
station ships, and shuttle ships. Station ships are referred to as supply vessels 
that are directly assigned to accompany, e.g., a Carrier Battle Group, and shuttle 
vessels are referred to as units that roam the area of operations and replenish 
individually operating units. Civilian facilities may still have to be used. 
Furthermore, these civilian facilities may also be embellished to full-scale 
Forward Logistic Sites, and thereby gain an even higher importance for intra-
theater logistic operations. 
However, due to the inherent nature of maritime operations, time and 
distance constraints within the theater of operations are of prime importance. In 
order to assure adequate logistic support, the operational and the logistic 
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planners need to take into account which strategy to apply. For instance, we 
might preposition supply units at stationary geographic points within the AOO, 
and expect combatant ships to meet us there for resupply, or we might schedule 
supply units to transit through the AOO to supply surface combatants whenever 
necessary based on a, for example, 14–30 day recurring schedule. 
B. PROBLEM DEFINITION 
Whenever speaking about military mission planning, especially maritime 
mission planning, logistics are of paramount importance in order to sustain any 
operation. Unfortunately, because the maritime environment imposes constraints, 
such as slow speeds, larger AOO, and longer distances to cover between 
combatants and supply units, the availability of supply ships within the AOO can 
impose a constraint on the versatility of preplanned missions necessary to 
accomplish the overall mission objective. Logistic support in a potentially hostile 
environment needs to be preplanned to ensure necessary support. 
It is important to determine whether the availability of logistic units 
imposes a constraint on operational mission planning, or if the logistic mission 
needs to adapt and be planned so as to meet all requirements to ensure 
complete fulfillment of the operational goal. Therefore, the military combatant 
commander and his planning staff need to address this issue from the earliest 
planning stages and review the plan continuously during planning. Operational 
planning and logistic planning cannot be regarded as two independent 
processes.  
In order to execute such intertwined mission planning it is necessary that 
both operational and logistic planners understand the planning objectives of one 
another. Having determined which operational and logistic strategy is to be 
applied, the planning needs to be continuously adjusted to fulfill the mission 
objectives necessary for overall mission success (Eccles, 1959, p. 68 pp). 
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C. OBJECTIVES 
In order to provide combatant commanders a reliable decision aid, this 
thesis develops a tool that determines feasible deployment schedules for Combat 
Logistic Force (CLF) units to fulfill logistic requirements, without restricting the 
operational plan. We modify the Navy Mission Planner (NMP) (Dugan, 2007) 
which was developed as a decision support tool to provide an optimal 
deployment schedule for surface combatants given a defined mission set in a 
confined AOO, and integrate functionalities based on the CLF planning tool 
(Brown and Carlyle, 2008), which provides optimal deployment schedules for 
CLF units, into the NMP, creating an enhanced automated operational and 
logistic planning tool. 
The output of the operational planning tool includes optimal scheduling of 
surface combatants given the mission set, and an optimal schedule for assigned 
CLF ships within the theater, enabling continuous logistic support throughout  the 
planning horizon. 
The logistics mission bears additional burdens on surface combatants 
because, in every scenario, supply ships are high-value units or mission-
essential units, and they must be protected by the combatants. 
 4
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II. BACKGROUND 
Every unit that is not supported is a defeated unit. 
Maurice de Saxe: Mes 
Rèveries XIII, 1732 
 
A. WHY IT IS MANDATORY TO PLAN LOGISTIC SUPPORT IN 
PARALLEL TO THE OPERATIONAL PLAN 
Looking into the past of the 20th century, we find many examples of why 
sound logistic planning is of such importance for the success of military 
operations. Looking back as far as WWII, we observe the logistic shortfalls of the 
Axis powers throughout the entire war period. This imposed insurmountable 
restrictions to their military operations, which finally led to defeat and the end of 
the war. 
Although Germany and Japan understood that resources, mainly crude oil, 
were mandatory to pursue their strategic goals, the operational tempo often left 
their logistic components trailing behind. Therefore, supplies of combat forces 
during offensive operations were decreased and logistic assets left vulnerable to 
enemy counterattacks. Even though both powers had military success in the 
early stages of the war, both were defeated decisively because of overstretched 
and unprotected supply lines and insufficient amounts of resources as a logical 
result of the ongoing attacks of allied forces against the enemy supply lines. 
Looking into more detail of the German campaign, we find that logistic 
planning prior to the beginning operations was not deemed important as supplies 
were picked on the way during the assault on France. This enforced the mindset 
of German military commanders about the role of logistical planning even more, 
before starting the Russian and North African campaigns. However, despite all 
warnings by the logistic planners, both campaigns ended in defeat, and finally 
forced Germany back into its own territory. During the final stages of the war, 
when the lessons learned with respect to logistical planning were embraced, and 
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logistical planning was thoroughly conducted, Germany did not possess the 
means to support their combat forces. The small numbers of support units were 
furthermore decreased by ongoing attacks of U.S. Forces against unprotected 
German supply lines (Goralski & Freeburg, 1987). 
Although the Japanese fate was similar to the German one at the end of 
the war, their road to defeat was a different one. Like Germany, Japan was 
driven by inadequate natural resources on its mainland. Also, similar to 
Germany, the Japanese Imperial Forces achieved military success in the early 
stages of their campaign. However, these early successes vastly increased 
Japanese-controlled area and thereby stretched the sea lines of communication 
between the occupied territories and Japan. Furthermore, disputes about 
disposition of fuel between the Army and the Navy led to shortfalls for combat 
units, which highly effected Japanese operations in the Pacific theater. After U.S. 
Forces started to attack their supply lines and tankers heading for Japan, the 
stock level of supplies depleted even faster. For example, insufficient supplies 
restricted Japanese ships to slower transit speeds in order to burn less fuel, 
enabling the ships to run at high speeds during engagements (Goralski & 
Freeburg, 1987). 
The perfect example of adequate and thorough logistical planning can be 
found in the same epoch, when focusing on the European campaign of the U.S. 
Forces. During the allied operations, logistic requirements and considerations 
played a key role with respect to the operations tempo. Whenever necessary 
goals of the strategic plan, such as conquering an important seaport, could not 
be achieved without logistic support, operations were stalled until logistic support 
could be ensured. Therefore, means of support were frequently adjusted along 
with alterations to the operational plan, and due to the destruction of vital 
infrastructure (Goralski & Freeburg, 1987). 
These examples precisely illustrate how flawed and/or uncoordinated 
logistic and operational planning lead to results not favorable to the outcome of a 
campaign, while the last shows the diametric opposite. 
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Returning to the present, we find lessons learned laid down in principal 
publications of several organizations. For example, the NATO logistic handbook 
says that the logistic planning staff needs to interact closely with the operational 
planning staff to ensure that logistic portions of the Concept of Operations 
(CONOPS) are “realistic and properly coordinated” (SNLC, 2007). 
The USN doctrine publication for Logistics (NDP 4, 2001) carries the idea 
of concurrent planning a step further by stating that the result of the parallel 
planning process is a logistic concept of operations (CONOPS) that has the 
same level of importance as the operational CONOPS. During the different 
planning phases, logisticians are responsible for identifying requirements and 
potential bottlenecks, while being supported by operational planners. 
B. OPERATIONAL PLANNING-PHASE MODEL 
Operational mission planning today enables the force commander to 
understand the multiple threads that can be associated with one single military 
campaign. Furthermore, it helps the planning staff visualize interdependencies 
between different tasks within the entire campaign. JDP3-0 (2006) introduces a 
phasing model that supports planners in these tasks. Using different phases 
deconflicts overall planning and reveals insights on how to achieve military 
objectives most efficiently by using smaller arrangements. Additionally, phasing 
can be utilized to assess risks for smaller portions of the campaign. 
The current phasing model includes five phases for operational mission 
planning as shown in Figure 1. 
 8
 
Figure 1 Operational planning phasing model 
From (JDP3-0, 2006) 
1. Phase 0 (Shape)  
Shaping activities are related to a specific mission area and are conducted 
continuously. The common goal is to strengthen relationships with allies and 
friends as well as to enhance international legitimacy and multinational support. 
In short, this shaping prepares the theater of operations as well as the political 
community (JDP3-0, 2006). 
2. Phase 1 (Deter) 
This phase incorporates primary military operations in order to 
demonstrate the capabilities of the force. The spectrum of these operations starts 
from preliminary intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance to prepositioning 
of forces. The actions taken in this phase build on activities in the earlier phase 
(JDP3-0, 2006). 
3. Phase 2 (Seize the Initiative) 
Seizing the initiative includes application of military force enabling the 
conducting of offensive operations as early as possible. The military actions 
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taken in this phase can be regarded first, as preparation for decisive actions in 
the following phase, and second, to dislodge enemy positions from his earlier 
actions. It contributes to greater freedom of friendly movements and the 
establishment of stable conditions (JDP3-0, 2006). 
4. Phase 3 (Dominate) 
After the initial combat operations have stalled enemy operations, this 
phase is focused on breaking the capability for organized resistance. It employs 
the full spectrum of military force capabilities including decisive action to achieve 
mission objectives. Thereby, favorable conditions for an early conclusion of 
operations and upcoming phases of the campaign may be established (JDP3-0, 
2006). 
5. Phase 4 (Stabilize) 
In this phase, the operations swing from sustained combat operations to 
stabilizing operations in order to maintain the military and/or political threat at a 
manageable level. This includes services to local authorities and the general 
population, if necessary. These services may include governance if no legitimate 
civilian entity is present, and support to nongovernmental or international 
organizations until civilian structures have been re-established. The end of this 
phase is reached when governing authority is handed over to local institutions 
(JDP3-0, 2006). 
6. Phase 5 (Enable Civil Authority) 
During this phase, the military end state is achieved and the end of the 
operations is reached. As during the stabilization phase, the force supports a 
legitimate local authority enabling the provision of essential services to the local 
population in order to maintain stability within the region (JDP3-0, 2006). 
 10
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III. COMBAT LOGISTIC FORCE (CLF) PLANNER – 
TRANSITION FROM A STRATEGIC TO AN OPERATIONAL 
DECISION AID 
A. INTRODUCTION TO THE ORIGINAL CLF  
The original version of the CLF planner was designed as a strategic 
decision aid studying the influence of composition and employment of the United 
States Navy (USN) CLF force and the resulting ability to support USN combat 
ships during their simultaneous worldwide operations. It uses integer linear 
programming to deterministically evaluate whether the anticipated missions are 
sustainable by the CLF, and to discover whether the available logistic support 
can sustain operations. It uses navigational tracks of each of its customer battle 
groups (BG) with daily fidelity over a planning horizon of 90–180 days to model 
CLF operations. 
Additional data such as logistic consumption factors, speed, and 
maximum capacities of the CLF ships are embedded in a spreadsheet. Also 
incorporated is a global network of navigable sea routes (Figure 2) that is the 
foundation for CLF ship movements between their respective homeports and 
operation areas.  
 12
 
Figure 2 Sea Routes Network 
The static sea routes network shows how the CLF ships can transit the world 
from their respective homeports to intercept BGs for underway replenishments. 
Figure from Doyle (2006) 
 
The BG transit routes are overlaid onto the static sea routes network and 
are also assumed to be navigable by CLF ships. The sustainability of a BG is 
estimated by applying the consumption factors of four aggregated commodities. 
These are distillate fuel, marine (DFM), aviation fuel (JP5), all dry stores such as 
food items, spare parts, tools, etc. (STOR), and ammunition (ORDN). 
Furthermore, port availability for CLF ship classes as well as individual hull 
numbers of CLF ships may also be modeled. 
The model provides valuable output in the form of optimized deployment 
schedules for CLF units and saw-tooth charts visualizing anticipated commodity 
levels for each commodity and individual customer BG. These plans consist of 
the day of replenishment, an estimated amount being transferred, as well as port 
visits by CLF ships to restock. The model determines whether a BG needs 
replenishment by comparing the estimated remaining capacities within the BG 
with a safety stock determined by the maritime Force Commander. Furthermore, 
it uses an even lower extremis level, if capacities fall below safety stock. 
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Inventories below safety stock or extremis level are penalized with respective 
penalty values the model seeks to minimize while generating the CLF 
deployment schedules (Brown & Carlyle, 2008). 
B. THE ROAD TO THE CLF PLANNING TOOL 
The CLF planner is a product of a series of Naval Postgraduate School 
Master’s Theses in Operations Research. Previous work includes studies about 
the necessary number of ships of a particular CLF type to enable sustained 
support for BGs on their way into theater as well as different concepts of 
employing these assets (Borden, 2001). Borden concludes that 11 T-AKE are 
necessary to assure support for USN operations as defined by his scenarios. He 
also discovers that prepositioning CLF units, specifically the T-AKE, is an 
attractive alternative of pairing a T-AO and a T-AKE as station ships for a BG, 
however, this would restrict the BG’s speed of advance. 
Cardillo (2004) examines the level of logistic support, developing several 
concurrent scenarios, employing every available naval combatant, and 
considering activation of fleet naval reserve units. His findings are that even with 
unrestricted port availability within the AOO of his basic scenario, some BG fuel 
levels are inadequate to sustain operations. Further findings include that 
additional logistic support, especially during an inter-theater shift of the CLF 
ships, is necessary in order to sustain maritime military operations. 
Further work focused on the issue of fleet ownership and control of CLF 
ships (Doyle, 2006). The USN numbered fleets command and control operations 
in assigned areas (Figure 3) worldwide. CLF units assigned to operations within 




Figure 3 The Numbered Fleet Areas of Operations 
From http://www.globalsecurity.org, 2000-2009 
 
For example, a Henry J. Kaiser class T-AO that supports operations in the 
Persian Gulf region is assigned to 5th Fleet. However, if operating in the 
Mediterranean, she will be assigned to 6th Fleet. Doyle reveals that inflexible 
fleet ownership detracts from logistic support and CLF effectiveness if multiple 
concurrent maritime operations in multiple fleet ownership areas need to be 
supported. 
C. THE CLF TRANSITION FROM A STRATEGIC TO AN OPERATIONAL 
PLANNING TOOL 
CLF planner was chosen among other software applications by the Navy 
Warfare Development Command (NWDC) and 2nd USN Fleet to be evaluated 
within the Maritime Operation Center (MOC) during the execution of Trident 
Warrior 2009 (TW09), a synthetic fleet exercise primarily simulating the 
operations of a global fleet station in the Gulf of Guinea paired with global 
operations in the Mediterranean, the Atlantic, and the Caribbean. TW09 is 
primarily aimed to practice and improve interoperability as well as coordination 
between different MOC’s situated in several locations in North America as well as 
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Europe. The anticipated application of the CLF planner required additional 
features and alterations to the existing functionalities of the planner.  
D. THE OPERATIONAL CLF PLANNER MODEL 
The original modeling formulation appears in Brown and Carlyle (2008). 
The following updated model incorporates necessary changes to account for the 
higher fidelity required for operational mission planning.  
1. Indices [Cardinality] 
v V∈   Class of shuttle ship [~5] 
s S∈   Shuttle ship [~25] 
( )v s   Class of shuttle ship s 
vs S S∈ ⊆  Shuttle ships in class v 
p P∈   Port available to load shuttle ships [~35] (alias px)  
bg BG∈  Battle group [~13] (alias bx, by)  
d D∈   Day [~181] (alias dx, dy, dh) 
bgdp DP D∈ ⊆  Days a battle group visits some port to load commodities  
p bgd D D∈ ⊆  Deployed days for battle group 
,bg ddh DH D∈ ⊆ For deployment day d, set of deployment days since the later of 
the start of the planning horizon and the latest port call. 
c C∈   Commodity group (DFM, JP5, STOR, ORDN) [~4] 
cˆ C⊆   Dry commodity subject to load fraction restrictions (STOR, ORDN)  
(alias c )  
For economy of exposition, we assume ( , )bg d  pairs are defined only for bgd D∈  
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2. Provided Data [Units] 
sspdSHUTTLE Speed of shuttle ship s [nm/day] 
inptTAT  Time to reload shuttle ship in port [days] 
,4 s pportok s   Binary indicator that shuttle ship s can reload at port p [binary] 
, , ,s bg d plegdays Shuttle ship s transit time at speed sspdSHUTTLE  to or from bg 
position on day d and port p following given sea routes and/or BG 
tracks [days] 
, , , , ,s bg d p bx dxcycledays  days required for shuttle ship s to depart bg on day d, reload 
at port p (or proceed directly), and then rendezvous with bx on day 
dx [days] 
, , , ,s bg d bx dxdirectdays  The number of steaming days for shuttle s to transit from the 
 position of bg on day d directly to the position of bx on subsequent 
day dx (i.e., without reloading in any port). (Policy limits may govern 
the minimum or maximum days allowed between these planned 
events.) 
, ,bg d cuseBG  Consumption by bg during day d of commodity c [c-units]  
,bg cmxload  Maximum capacity of bg to carry commodity c [c-units] 
bg,cinit_load  bg inventory of commodity c on first deployed day [c-units] 
s s sinit_lat ,init_lon ,init_state  optional pre-positioning of shuttle s either “empty” and  
requiring routing to a port, or “loaded” and requiring routing to a 
customer battle group. 
csafety  Minimum desired fraction of ,bg cmxload  to be held at all times 
[fraction] 
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cextremis  Extreme minimum desired fraction of ,bg cmxload  to be held at all 
times, c cextremis safety≤  [fraction]. 
,bg dhitOK  Logical indicator if bg can CONSOL on day d [binary] 
,s ccapacity  Shuttle ship s capacity to deliver commodity c [c-units] 
ˆ ˆ,c cmnfrac mxfrac  Minimum, maximum fraction of T-AKE dry capacity that must be 
loaded with dry commodity cˆ  [fraction] 
_ csafety penalty  Penalty per deficit unit of desired storage below safety-stock 
held by any BG [penalty per c-unit] 
_extremis factor  Multiplier (>1, e.g. 10) for penalty per deficit unit of desired 
storage below extremis held by any BG [dimensionless] 
_negative factor  Multiplier (> _extremis factor , e.g. 1000) for penalty per deficit 
unit of desired storage below zero held by any BG [dimensionless] 
win   Minimum number of days between bg consol 
3. Derived Data 
, ,s bg cmxconsol  Maximum delivery shuttle ship s can make to bg on any day of 
commodity c [c-units].  This is defined as:  
,,min{ , }s cbg cmxload capacity . 
In addition, for T-AKE shuttle ships and dry commodities cˆ  sharing dry storage, 
and subject to limits on the minimum and maximum fractions of dry capacity that 
must be carried in every T-AKE load, this is restricted to: 
,min{ ,bg cmxload ˆ
ˆ
, ˆmin[ ,1 ]* }c cc c s c
mxfrac mnfrac capacity
≠
− ∑   
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or, the maximum permitted T-AKE load of dry commodity cˆ , or the amount of 
commodity cˆ  that can be loaded after the minimum loads of other dry 
commodities ˆc c≠  sharing dry storage are loaded. 
, , , , ,s bg d p bx dxcycledays  gives the number of days required for shuttle ship s to depart 
bg on day d to reload at some port p (or proceed directly) and then rendezvous 
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min , min min
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Note that this admits a cycle with slack time (or, “shuttle waiting time”) 
, , , , 0s bg d bx dxdx d cycledays− − ≥ , and that because of the relative motion of a shuttle 
ship and a BG over navigable sea routes, and their daily proximity to ports and to 
each other, there will be cases in which planning for a shuttle to wait for this 
amount of time is better than restricting plans to have no such slack. 
4. Decision Variables 
,bg dVISIT  Binary indicator that at least one shuttle visits bg on day d 
, , ,s p bg dHIT  Binary indicator of shuttle s coming from port p to a CONSOL visit 
of bg on day d (depends on ,bg dhitOK ) (One port is called “direct” 
and indicates that the associated CONSOL visit follows some prior 
one without an intervening port call to reload.) (Restriction of shuttle 
s initial location and state may preclude some HIT events.  E.g., 
from some initial location, an empty shuttle would have to transit to 
a port, reload, then transit to a bg location by day d.) 
, ,s d cSLOAD  Shuttle s commodity c contents at end of day d [c-units] 
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, , ,s bg d cCONSOL  Amount of shuttle s delivery to bg on day d of commodity c  
[c-units] 
, ,bg d cSHORTAGE Amount of inventory deficiency of c for bg, at end of day d 
[c-units] 
, ,bg d cEXTREMIS  Amount of extreme deficiency of c for bg, at end of day d  
[c-units] 
, ,bg d cNEGINV  Magnitude of negative inventory of c for bg at end of day d, has this 
[c-units] 
5. Formulation 
{ }, , , ,
,, 1, , , ,
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Inequalities (1) account for shuttle cargo contents day by day. Inequalities 
(2) limit day-by-day cumulative CONSOL volumes of each commodity to the 
cumulative usage of each BG through the end of that day.  We assume that on 
the first planning day, each BG contains some stated initial load quantity. 
Thereafter, daily use is deducted, and replenishments from port calls of those 
commodities offered and shuttle CONSOLs are added.   Elastic inequalities (3) 
reckon cumulative inventory state of each commodity at the end of each  
planning day, and compare this to the cumulative usage less desired safety-stock 
level at the end of that day, representing any shortage, extreme shortage, or 
negative inventory required to reconcile this state. Each inequality (4) limits  
the CONSOL volume transferred from a shuttle ship, to a BG, on some given 
day, to be zero unless a replenishment event takes place. Constraints (5) allow 
at most one port source for each CONSOL.  This “port” may be “direct,” 
indicating no preceding port call.  Constraints (6) restrict successive shuttle 
rendezvous with battle groups so that each such visit is followed by sufficient 
time to cycle to a port for re-supply. Each constraint (7-11) permits a shuttle to 
engage in at most one activity on a given day.  Variable domains are stated by 
constraints (12). The objective (13) expresses a penalty with a component for 
any shortage below safety-stock, extreme shortage below minimum stock, and 
any negative inventory as well as less rewards for commodity volume delivered.  
The rewards here are 10 percent of the safety stock shortage penalties, and 
attract maximal delivered volumes, rather than merely deliveries to avoid 
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shortages. The model can schedule a single shuttle ship sortie from port to make 
many separate CONSOL visits, perhaps to different battle groups. 
E. ENHANCED FEATURES OF THE OPERATIONAL PLANNING 
INSTANCE OF CLF 
The following paragraphs highlight the CLF embellishments introduced 
here for operational logistic planning.  
1. Sea Routes Network and Ports 
Major updates have been made to the static sea routes network  
(Figure 4). More than 100 ports have been added, along with 350 more nodes, 
which result in over 550 new navigable arcs. Besides the sheer increase in the 
number of ports, we also now model limited availability of each of the four main 
commodities in these ports. Earlier features restricting availability of ports for 
entire classes of CLF ships down to individual hull numbers remain. Additionally, 
BGs that enter a port can be restocked such that replenishments by CLF ships 
just before a BG’s port visit or shortly thereafter may be unnecessary. 
 
Figure 4 New Sea Routes Network 
The new sea routes network exhibits the increased fidelity compared to Figure 2. 
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2. Force Composition and Activation 
A complete catalog of every active USN ship has been added, combatant 
as well as CLF, which enables the planner to insert ships directly associated with 
the scenario by hull number and name. Additionally, instead of having BGs and 
CLF ships start at the first day of the overall planning horizon, the model now is 
able to account for BGs that arrive later in an AOO, or become active at a later 
point in time due to other commitments such as overhaul, maintenance, or 
transfer from a different operation not accounted for by the model. Furthermore, 
BGs may leave the operation before the planning horizon expires. 
3. Dashboard Functionalities 
The “dashboard” in the Microsoft Excel interface has also been polished. 
The number of available maps of possible geographic operation areas has been 
increased to provide more views and more scales of views worldwide. Moreover, 
various display options are included in the maps allowing a planner to precisely 
demonstrate possible courses of action (COA) and the resulting implications. For 
example, besides nodes, ports and sea routes, the model now displays the BG 
navigational tracks and the CLF ship navigational tracks. Furthermore, we can 
display the exact position of an underway replenishment between a CLF ship and 
a BG anywhere on the planet. Ports utilized by CLF ships to restock their 
inventory levels are displayed as well.  
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Figure 5 Enhanced CLF visualization 
This shows the new display functionality in the operational CLF planner, here the 
North Atlantic region. The display feature is in color. Red (darkest) lines 
represent the arcs, red circles represent nodes, red crosshairs are available 
ports. Green (light) lines visualize CLF ship movements, and green circle shows 
underway replenishment with a customer BG. Turquoise (very light displayed) 
triangles are daily BG positions, and similar colored lines are BG tracks. Blue 
circles indicate that the port was used by a CLF ship to restock commodities. The 
data boxes can be activated by clicking on any feature. 
4. Shuttle Ship Operations 
Our operational plans now address smaller BGs than the legacy strategic 
plans involving large carrier battle groups. Now we deal with BGs that may 
consist of individual ships. Accordingly, where before CLF assumed a shuttle 
ship would transfer all its cargo in a single consolidation (CONSOL), or perhaps 
two, now we allow a shuttle to make an unlimited number of consolidations until 
the model decides to make a replenishment port call. A consolidation is 
considered as an event where a CLF ship rendezvous with a BG to replenish the 
BGs station ship or the entire BG. 
 25
5. Animation 
We have equipped CLF with an animation feature to illustrate the time and 
location dynamics of suggested plans on any of a catalog of world maps. The 
animation is very helpful to visualize the synchronized movements of shuttles 
among the also-moving BG customers. 
6. Employment States 
Many more alternate types of employment states have been introduced to 
better represent the rate at which BGs consume commodities. For instance, a 
BG might engage in “light,” “medium,” or “heavy” flight operations, influencing 
JP5 consumption. 
F. TRIDENT WARRIOR 2009 (TW09) – OPERATIONAL PLANNING WITH 
THE CLF PLANNER 
Trident Warrior is an annual operational command and control exercise 
hosted by the USN and Naval Network Warfare Command (NNWC). The scope 
of the 2009 experiment is to evaluate new technologies, tactics, techniques and 
doctrines enhancing the capabilities of the war fighter at sea by using committed 
assets from 2nd U.S. fleet (i.e., USS KEARSARGE (LHD3), USS NORMANDY 
(CG60), USS FARRAGUT (DDG99), USS BULKELEY (DDG84), and USS 
ALEXANDRIA (SSN757)) as well as a worldwide network of maritime command 
centers (Poeltler et al., 2008). 
1. Baseline Scenario 
The setting for TW09 incorporates two major operating areas situated in 
the Gulf of Guinea and the Caribbean with additional operations in the 
Mediterranean and off the U.S. East coast. The full scenario consists of 17 BGs 
composed of 34 ships of various classes such as aircraft carriers, large-deck 
amphibious ships, cruisers, destroyers, frigates, and Coast Guard cutters as well 
as six CLF ships, for example, fleet replenishment oilers, modular dry cargo 
ammunition ships, and fast combat supply ships. The size of a BG ranges from a 
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full-scale carrier battle group to a single ship conducting individual mission 
assignments. Special focus is on a large-deck amphibious ship acting as a 
Global Fleet Station in the Gulf of Guinea. This ship is operating to support 
coastal West African states by conducting a variety of missions such as 
construction work (e.g., building schools and roads), intra-theater security 
support, and medical aid. The time horizon of the operation extends over 180 
days, starting on April 1, 2009, and ending October 6, 2009. 
2. CLF Optimization Results 
Necessary input for the CLF planner such as daily BG navigational tracks, 
initial load outs for each commodity of each respective BG and CLF ship, and 
assignment of CLF ships to one or multiple BGs are defined by the given 
scenario. During the course of the exercise the operational logistics planning cell 
actively used the CLF planner to evaluate logistic sustainability of different 
operational courses of action. 
The CLF planner is installed on a WINTEL Laptop with 2 GB RAM using 
the General Algebraic Modeling Software (GAMS) and the commercial CPLEX 
solver and solves times of about four minutes. The scenarios used during Trident 
Warrior generate mixed integer programs with about 5500 constraints, 6000 
variables of which 1200 binary variables. After each solution, the optimization 
generates a deployment plan for the active CLF ships showing where and when 
a CLF ship replenishes a BG or makes a port call to re-stock its own inventory. 
Furthermore, this deployment plan shows the quantity of each commodity 
transferred (Table 1). Additionally, the BG daily state table (Table 2), an output 
spreadsheet containing inventory levels for each commodity and information on 
replenishments per BG, provides invaluable support for the both, the logistics 
and operational planner. Moreover, this output helps to identify whether, for 
instance, minor changes to a port visit schedule may have a major impact to the 
logistic sustainability of an anticipated course of action (COA). 
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Table 1 Shuttle Schedules 
This shuttle schedule from the CLF interface is an excerpt of 20 days. It shows 
the employment state and inventory levels of the CLF ship, the replenished BGs 
and CONSOL positions, including the calculated transferred amount per 
commodity. 
 
Table 2 BG daily state 
The BG Daily State table shows the daily position of a BG and the inventory 
levels of all ships of the BG aggregated to one value. We see the example of a 
carrier BG over 22 days. Furthermore, we can obtain information on 
replenishments (i.e., which CLF ship and the amount of commodities) which 
represents the results of the optimization. 
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An accompanying saw-tooth diagram displays whether a COA is 
supportable, or if ships will drop below the designated inventory thresholds. We 
can easily observe in Figure 6 that the suggested COA is supportable within the 
time horizon and with respect to DFM. We see that two BG’s drop close to or just 
below the extremis inventory level, but receive supplies shortly thereafter. For 
isolated information on each active BG and the other commodities, the planner 
can chose a BG from a drop down list in the Excel interface.  
 
Figure 6 Saw-tooth Diagram 
This intentionally overloaded saw-tooth diagram shows the DFM inventory level 
for each active BG in a different color for 59 days of the planning horizon. 
The introduced animation feature was frequently used by the Trident 
Warrior 2009 logistic planning cell to display the dynamic movements of BGs and 
CFL ships to the operational planners and decision makers. This added feature 
in combination with the saw-tooth diagram and the generated output tables 
provides a valid, comprehensible, and integral element to the overall evaluation 
of one or multiple COA’s and operational decision process. Figure 7 shows a 












Figure 7 Animation 
This shows a close-up look at the animation feature in the Caribbean AOO. The 
original feature is colored and displayed triangles represent different ships. The 
blue (dark) triangles represent combat ships while the green (light) triangles are 
CLF ships. A CONSOL is represented by overlaying triangles. The picture was 
formatted to enhance visibility of landmasses. 
 30
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 31
IV. MODELING COMBINED OPERATIONAL AND LOGISTICS 
PLANNING 
A. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE ORIGINAL NAVAL MISSION PLANNER 
(NMP) 
The Navy Mission Planner (Dugan, 2007) is an automated decision 
support tool that uses mathematical optimization to seek the optimal daily 
employment schedule for surface and subsurface combatants of the USN on the 
operational level for a given planning horizon. It takes a predefined set of daily 
maritime missions located in each region of the AOO, along with the capabilities 
of each individual ship, and assigns the ships into predefined regions of a 
confined AOO such as the Korean Peninsula or the Mediterranean. It has the 
ability to assign multiple concurrent mission sets to a single ship depending on 
the operational capabilities of this particular unit. For example, a CG assigned to 
a region within the AOO could conduct air defense (AD), while also being 
assigned to surface warfare (SUW), maritime interdiction operations (MIO), 
STRIKE, and INTEL, or this ship could conduct any of a number of combined 
mission sets (CMC). At the same time, the planner also has the option to define 
mission dependencies such a mine counter measure (MCM) operation necessary 
prior to the passage of a narrow straight. 
Additional inputs to the predefined mission set and the ship capabilities 
are the duration of each mission requirement for each region as well as the 
priority of the mission. With this information, the NMP seeks the best daily 
employment schedule for the available units. 
Silva (2009) modifies the original NMP, enhancing the overall performance 
of the tool. Instead of using a static set of detached regions within an AOO, Silva 
introduces a network representation of the AOO. He enables the planner to 
flexibly assign ships within the AOO, calculate the shortest distance between 
adjacent nodes representing region locations, and easily determine the shortest 
transit times between regions. Using the network representation enables the 
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planning tool to use shortest paths  (Ahuja et al., 1993),  which decreases  
the overall computation time significantly. 
NMP still seeks the optimal feasible daily deployment plan for the 
available units for each region and each day in the planning horizon. But, instead 
of using manual enumeration, the model now uses automated constrained 
enumeration. This implies that a global optimal solution for the scheduling 
problem might not be found, however, the advantages with respect to runtime 
and practicability weigh heavier. Nevertheless, the planning tool still produces 
near-optimal schedules that are more useful to the planner, because it is not 
necessary to search through an enormous amount of schedules in order to 
determine which one to use (Silva, 2009). 
B. MODELING LOGISTICS – GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 
1. Input factors 
In order to capture inherent characteristics of maritime operations, the 
optimization model requires several factors on which it bases its calculations for 
the optimized deployment schedules. The model consists of five major input 
categories.  
a. Time 
The necessary time input by the planning staff is (1) the planning 
horizon, and (2) the time fidelity of planning. The planning horizon constitutes the 
duration of the entire operation. The time fidelity of planning describes the detail, 
say if the steps of planning are hourly, daily, or weekly. 
b. Geography 
The planning tool requires the geographic boundaries of the AOO 
(e.g. the Arabian Peninsula, the Baltic, or the Korean Peninsula). Furthermore, 
the planner must divide the AOO into smaller operating areas over which a ship 
can be expected to fulfill missions, or simply regions.  
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c. Commodities 
Similar to earlier studies, we will aggregate the individual material 
classes into four main commodity groups: 
1. DFM (distillate fuel marine, NATO F75/F76) 
2. JP-5 (aviation fuel, NATO F44) 
3. Stores (aggregates all dry stores such as food items, spare 
parts, tools, etc.) 
4. Ordnance (aggregates all ammunition) 
d. Units 
Each ship is defined by its respective type, which is associated with 
its capabilities, and consumption factors. The planner has to define the specific 
combat and supply ships anticipated to participate in the operation. 
e. Consumption Factors 
Each unit and each mission assignment have distinct consumption 
factors for each of the four commodities, depending on the crew size and the 
employment state of a ship. Depending on the phase of the operation, ships will 
conduct different missions, which requires different specific systems (e.g., fire 
control radar, weapon system, additional propulsion) to be online, while other 
deployment states just require standard systems (e.g., navigation radar, 
propulsion) to be available. Therefore, consumption will rise as soon as a ship 
conducts intensive missions such as strike or air defense. The implemented 
consumption factors are linked to different phases in the operation 
f. Inventory Thresholds 
The logistics portion of the model is driven by the consumption of 
commodities. Given the maximum inventory level for each commodity the 
planner has to define a safety stock level (e.g., at 60 percent of capacity) and an 
extremis stock level (e.g., at 25 percent). These thresholds are associated with a 
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penalty value within the model ensuring urgent support for these units. These 
inventory thresholds are set at commander’s discretion, depending on the 
campaign, availability of CLF units, and area of operations. 
C. AN INTEGER LINEAR PROGRAM TO OPTIMIZE NAVY MISSION 
PLANNING: NMP AND LOGISTIC SUPPORT 
The model presented here derives from the purely operational planner, 
NMP introduced by Dugan (2007) and the embellished version introduced by 
Silva (2009). The logistic portion of the new planning tool is inspired by the CLF 
planning tool (Brown & Carlyle, 2008). 
The following integer linear program, NMP with logistics, seeks the best 
achievable set of combat and CLF ship deployment schedules. 
1. Sets and Indices [Cardinality] 
s S∈   Ship (hull number and name, alias s’) [~50] 
s CS S∈ ⊆  Combatant ship [~40] 
s SS S∈ ⊆  Supply ship [~10] 
( ,CS SS CS SS S∩ =Φ ∪ = ) 
m M∈  Mission type (alias m’) [~12]  
  (e.g., ASW, AAW, NSG, …, CAN_HIT, ESCORT, 
  CLOSE_ESCORT) 
sc C∈   Combined mission capability set for ship s [~10] 
cm M∈  Mission types in combined (simultaneous) mission set c 
  (e.g., ship s can simultaneously perform mission types m in 
combined mission capability set c. 
p P∈   Employment schedules [~1 million] 
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sp P P∈ ⊆  Employment schedules for ship s [~1 million] 
  ( s
s
P P≡∪ , sP  is a partition of P.) 
( )s p   Ship of employment schedule p 
r R∈   Regions in AOO [~30] 
SSr R R∈ ⊆  Subset of regions navigable by supply ships [~25] 
SSX SSr R R∈ ⊆  Supply ships in these regions must have combatant escorts 
[~25] 
d D∈   Days in planning horizon (alias ', ''d d ) [~14] 
( , )r p d  Region employment schedule p visits on day d  
{ , '} pd d D∈  Deployment schedule p for supply ship s(p) has routes that 
can begin and end deliveries in epochs defined by these 
days 
n N∈   Ordinal for multiple missions of the same mission type [~5] 
  (E.g., several ships may conduct ASW at the same time 
within the same region, but with different effectiveness. 
,{ , '} r dm m Q∈  In region r on day d, mission m can be undertaken only if  
  mission 'm is fully accomplished 
i I∈   Commodity category (e.g., DFM, JP5, STOR, ORDN) 
2. Data [Units] 
, , ,m n r dvalue  Priority of n-th mission of type m, in region r on day d  [1-10] 
[value]   
({ , , , }m n r d MNRD∈  tuples exist only for non-zero values) 
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,c maccomplish  Level of accomplishment of combined mission set sc C∈ , 
mission cm M∈   [0.0-1.0] (Note that each ship may have its 
own set of combined mission capability sets, and that some 
of these sets may contain the same missions, but with 
different accomplish rates to represent the ship choosing to 
change emphasis between missions.) 
,s icap   Capacity of ship s for commodity category i [i-units] 
,s iinit_load  Initial load of ship s, commodity i [i-units] ( , ,s i s iinit_load cap≤ ) 
, ,s c iuse   Daily consumption of commodity i by combatant s employing 
combined mission capability c. [i-units] 
isafety  Safety stock fraction of capacity for commodity i  
[fraction] 
iextremis  Extremis stock fraction of cargo category i [fraction]  
  (0 1i iextremis safety< < < ) 
ipen_safe  Penalty per unit of violation of safety stock for commodity i  
  [value/i-unit]  
ipen_extr  Penalty per unit violation of extremis stock for commodity i 
 [value/i-unit]  
ipen_out  Penalty per unit violation below zero stock for commodity i 
 [value/i-unit] ( 0_i i ipen_out pen_ext pen safe> > > ) 
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use_supply_ships   Indicates that supply ship employment scheduling and 
combatant commodity inventories should be included in  
employment plan [binary] 
close_escort_required   Indicates that every supply ship needs close 
escort every day it is deployed [binary] 
3. Induced Index Sets 
{ , , , }m n r d MNRD∈  4-tuple exists only if , , , 0m n r dvalue >  or , 0s maccomplish >  
for some ship that can employ a combined mission capability 
set that includes mission m in region r on day d 
{ , , }m r d MRD∈  3-tuple exists only if { , , , }m n r d MNRD∈  does for some n 
4. Variables [Units] 
, , ,m n r dU  Level of accomplishment of the n-th mission type m 
assignment in region r on day d [0.0-1.0] 
, ,m r dV  = 1 if mission m is fully accomplished in region r on day d 
[binary] 
, , ,s c r dW  = 1 if ship s employs combined mission capability c on day d 
[binary] 
, ', ,s s r dX  = 1 only if ships s and s’ are both in region r on day d 
[binary]] 
pY   = 1 if schedule p is selected [binary] 
, ', ,s s d iXFER  Volume of commodity i transferred from supply ship s to 
  combatant 's on day d [i-units] 
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, , , ', ''s d i d dLOAD Volume of commodity i transferred from supply ship s on day  
d during deployment from days 'd to ''d [i-units] 
, ,s d iSLACK  Combatant s, day d, commodity i stock in excess of safety-
stock  
[i-units] 
, ,s d iV_SAFE  Violation of safety stock level for combatant s, day d,  
commodity i [i-units] 
, ,s d iV_EXTR  Violation of extremis stock level for combatant s, day d,  
commodity i [i-units] 
, ,s d iV_OUT  Violation of positive stock level for combatant s, day d, 
commodity i [i-units] 
5. Formulation 
, , , , , ,
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0 , , (T15)s,d,iV_OUT s CS d D i I≥ ∀ ∈ ∈ ∈  
6. Discussion 
The objective (T0) measures the weighted value of (partially) completed 
missions. Each (packing) constraint (T1) allows at most one employment 
schedule per ship. Each constraint (T2) permits a combatant to employ a 
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combined mission capability on a day only if an employment schedule has been 
chosen for that ship. Each constraint (T3) bounds the sum of the partial 
completion values of all instances of a given mission, in a given region on a given 
day, by the total amount of activity for that mission in the region. Each constraint 
(T4) allows a task to be considered fully completed in a region on a given day if 
there is at least one total units of activity for that mission in that region on that 
day. Each constraint (T5) allows activity in a region, mission, and day, only if a 
prerequisite mission in that region on that day has been fully accomplished. If 
close escort is not required, each constraint (T6) permits a supply ship to enter a 
region requiring escort only on a day for which the ‘ESCORT’ mission has been 
fully accomplished there; if the ‘ESCORT’ mission has been completed in a 
region, any number of supply ships may enter the region.   If close escort is 
required, each constraint (T7) requires that the number of supply ships in a 
region on a day is limited by the level of accomplishment of the 
‘CLOSE_ESCORT’ mission in that region that day; this means that there will be 
at least one combatant per escorted supply ship.  Each constraint (T8) permits 
location of a supply ship for commodity transfer in a region of a selected 
employment schedule. Each constraint (T9) does this for a combatant, and each 
constraint (T10) allows collocation with a combatant only if the combatant 
employs the mission in the combined mission capable set. Each constraint (T11) 
limits transfer of a commodity between a supply ship and a combatant to a day 
when the ships are collocated in the same region.  Each constraint (T12) limits 
the deliveries a shuttle ship can make during any epoch after a port visit to 
resupply. Each constraint (T13) limits deliveries from a supply ship during a 
deployment to its capacity.  Each constraint (T14) accounts for a cumulative 
commodity used by a ship up to the end of a given day, and reckons any 
shortage below safety-, extremis-, or zero-stock levels (Note that any such 
shortage will be carried forward to later days until it is remedied by commodity 
transfer). Variable domains are defined by (T15). 
 42
D. MODIFICATIONS TO THE ORIGINAL NMP TO ENABLE LOGISTIC 
MODELING 
In order to introduce logistic planning to NMP, we have modified certain 
aspects of NMP. For example, we have to add new missions such as 
consolidation (CONSOL), escort (ESCORT) and close escort 
(CLOSE_ESCORT), and transit (TRANSIT) to the concurrent mission capability 
set (CMC). 
1. Concurrent Mission Capability Sets (CMC) 
The CMC for a ship is based on the ship class and the design of the ship. 
For instance, cruisers or destroyers are more suited to conduct air defense (AD) 
and STRIKE mission than mine hunters. As discussed earlier, logistic ships are 
essential for maritime operations, and therefore very likely and opportune targets 
for opposing forces. The addition of two support missions to CMC’s accounts for 
the necessary protection requirements of such units. In general, an escort 
mission is defined as a combatant ship accompanying a convoy or another 
military force to ensure appropriate protection for these units (JDP 1-02, 2001).  
We define two distinct escort missions: 
a. Escort 
The general escort mission assures that a supply ship is protected 
while transiting through the regions of the AOO by the respective combat ships 
assigned to the region it currently transits. Protection duties are handed over to a 
unit in an adjacent region as soon as the supply ship enters that region. This 
relaxes force allocation planning, because it does not bind additional resources 
to accompany the supply ship at all times. This type of escort mission may only 
be suitable in an operating environment with a very low threat level. Although we 
describe the escort mission with the example of a supply ship, it may also be 
applied to other ships, for example, a CVN. 
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b. Close Escort 
The close escort mission incorporates the same characteristics as 
the escort mission, but requires the planning tool to allocate resources (e.g., 
combat ships) to accompany each unit that needs protection at all times while 
transiting through the AOO. This mission is applicable during all threat levels, but 
certainly mandatory during the rise of hostilities and combat operations.  In 
particular, close escort requires at least one combatant ship be assigned per 
supply ship in each region requiring such company and on each day requiring 
such. 
c. Underway Replenishment 
In order to account for the capabilities of supply ships we also add 
an UNREP mission to the CMC of all supply ship classes. An UNREP or 
replenishment at sea is defined as an operation necessary to transfer supply 
goods such as fuel, stores, ordnance, and personnel between ships at sea 
(JDP 1-02, 2001). This is a difference to the CLF planner, where we refer to 
underway replenishment as a consolidation (CONSOL). The difference is that a 
CONSOL describes an event where a CLF ships rendezvous with a BG to 
replenish the station ship or the entire BG. An UNREP specifically refers to two 
ships that execute a replenishment at sea alongside. 
d. Transit 
NMP now has a transit (TRANSIT) mission that accounts for ships 
transiting a region without conducting any other mission.  Combatants in transit 
still consume commodities.  A new region “rTransit” replaces any region on a 
transit route traversed in TRANSIT and unable to conduct any other mission at 
the same time. 
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2. Logistic Data 
a. Consumption Factors 
We insert logistic consumption factors to model daily use of 
commodities for a ship. These consumption factors are dependent on the crew 
size and the employment state of the ship. Similar to the CLF planner, we also 
use the aggregated four main commodity groups, DFM, JP5, STOR, and ORDN. 
The different employment states of a ship are those chosen by the optimization. 
Appendix A provides an overview of these factors. 
b. Initial Load Outs and Maximum Capacities 
A ship is characterized by its purpose, design, but also dimensions. 
Depending on these attributes, a ship has different capacities for each 
commodity. These capacities are incorporated in the data set. At the beginning of 
each planning epoch (e.g., 15 days) the planner needs to enter the current or 
initial commodity load out for a ship on the day she joins our operations.  
c. Inventory Thresholds 
Similar to the CLF planner, we introduce two inventory thresholds 
to NMP that serve as indicators for the model showing that a ship is short in 
supplies of one or more commodities. The first threshold, the safety level, is 
defined as the level of supply that is required to be on hand to permit continuous 
operations even if the normal rate of replenishment is interrupted or 
unpredictable fluctuation in supply occurs (JDP 1-02, 2001). The second 
threshold, the extremis level, situated below the safety level is defined as an 
inventory level that does not permit continuous operations without immediate 
support by a CLF unit. Both inventory threshold levels are associated with a 
penalty value that accumulates every day as long as the deficiency is not 
resolved and diminishes the overall value of the objective function. 
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3. Graphical User Interface 
In addition to the functionalities and features already developed by Dugan 
and Silva, we add visualization in form of saw-tooth charts to support analysis on 
probable COA’s from the logistic perspective. For instance, these charts disclose 
whether a COA is sustainable within the planning epoch and how future 
operations are affected. Furthermore, it assists in answering questions such as 
the minimum number of necessary CLF ships. Additionally, the planner can 
choose from three planning phases according to the phase planning model, 
which uses 6 phases (JDP3-0, 2006). 
All data entries such as ships, consumption factors or combined mission 
capable sets in the graphical user interface can be edited by the planner to suit 
the operational requirements of a specific AOO. Furthermore, ship classes can 
be added to the model as long as required data for each new class is available. 
Additionally, we insert a node that models the port Sasebo, Japan, where 
CLF ships can restock to their respective maximum capacity for each commodity 
for our scenario (we could add more such resupply ports). This is based on the 
assumption that we are operating in a confined AOO, and that most likely one or 
more Forward Logistic Sites or Advanced Logistic Support Sites are available 
somewhere, preferably in or near the AOO. This carries the implication that 
availability of ports to serve for logistic purposes has been negotiated prior to the 
beginning of operations, that critical supporting infrastructure such as a nearby 
airfield or cargo-handling facilities are available, and that all necessary 
commodities will be available to be transported to these locations. 
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V. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION 
A. SCENARIO 
The two legacy theses on NMP, Dugan (2007) and Silva (2009), 
developed unclassified, face valid, but purely operational scenarios in the Korean 
Peninsula AOO. We use the scenario developed by Silva to show how 
incorporation of logistics impacts the scheduling of combat ships assigned to the 
area. For better illustration, the following paragraphs provide a quick overview 
about the scenario and the results obtained by Silva. 
1. Missions 
The original scenario includes eleven maritime mission types that are 
precisely described in Silva (2009). Appendix B provides a definition for each 
mission type that is taken from JDP 1-02 (2001). These mission types range from 
defensive missions such as air defense (AD), theater ballistic missile defense 
(TBMD), and intelligence (INTEL) to offensive missions, for instance, STRIKE, 
anti submarine warfare (ASW), surface warfare (SUW), and naval surface fire 
support (NSFS). They represent typical missions for maritime operations. Silva 
creates a portfolio of maritime missions scheduled over the extent of the planning 
horizon (Table 3). 
 
Table 3 Missions 
This excerpt of the mission table shows the primary mission type by region as 
well as the necessary prerequisite missions. Furthermore, it displays the mission 
values, which are the overall priority indicator, and the start day and end day for 
each mission. For example, mission m3 addresses ASW in region r1 from days 
1-4, contributes mission value 7, but requiring that prerequisite missions AD and 
SUW be completed beforehand. 
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2. Area of Operation 
The AOO is defined as the maritime region engulfing the Korean 
Peninsula. Silva introduces a network representation for the different operating 
regions in the AOO. It is understood that each node represents a region rather 
than a single position in the AOO. It can be thought of as an umbrella spanning 
from the node position depicted by its latitude and longitude with a varying radius 
to be defined by the operational planner. The arcs between adjacent nodes 
represent the shortest great circle distance in nautical miles between those 
nodes (Appendix E). 
 
Figure 8 Area of Operations 
This shows the confined AOO around the Korean Peninsula along with the 
network representation of the operating regions. Vertical and horizontal lines 
represent the grid for longitude and latitude. Nodes are represented as red (dark) 




The ships allocated to the operation arrive over time into the AOO and the 
model assigns them to predetermined regions to conduct the required missions. 
The first ships to arrive are immediately available for tasking, while later arriving 
ships are tasked upon their estimated arrival. Specific arrival dates for ships and 
starting regions along with the necessary CMC’s are entered into NMP by the 
planner.  See Table 4. 
 
Table 4 Force Composition 
The force composition for the ongoing operation shows the sequential arrival of 
combat ships into the AOO. This shows that, for example, CG61, CG66, and 
DDG53 are available for tasking on day 1 of the operation, while CG72, DDG80, 
and FFG47 are available from day 7. We can also observe the starting region 
and candidate combined mission capability sets for each ship. The CMC’s, 
denoted as CXX in this table, exhibit a ship’s capability to conduct specific 
missions required in the operation. For example, C1 for CG 66 includes AD, 
SUW.  (Figure from NMP Excel interface.) 
4. Silva’s Analysis Results 
In the analysis of the baseline run Silva focuses on the accomplishment of 
prerequisite missions and high-priority missions. Silva finds that in some cases 
gaps or unaccomplished prerequisite missions lead to accomplishment gaps in 
primary missions. For example, mission m3, which an ASW mission from day 1-4 
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in region r1 adding the value of 8, requires AD and SUW to be accomplished. In 
this case, the primary mission remains unaccomplished, and thereby does not 
accrue any value. Additionally, because the prerequisite SUW is not a planner-
scheduled mission for the first days in the time horizon, it does not contribute to 
the overall value achieved by the optimization. Furthermore, he also shows that 
NMP achieves more value in lower-priority local missions instead of dispatching 
a ship into another region with long off-station transit times. That results in long 
gaps even for the highest priority missions. For instance, a TBMD mission for the 
entire planning horizon in region r2 with value 20 remains unaccomplished, 
because the available assets do not suffice to generate enough AD, which is 
prerequisite for the TBMD mission in this region.  
During the further course of the analysis, Silva alters mission assignments 
and maximum stall days (i.e., a limit on the number of days a combatant can stay 
in the same region) to improve the overall rate of completed missions. The 
number of maximum stall days forces a ship assigned to a specific region in the 
AOO to move on to another regions as soon as this planner-defined epoch is 
reached. In the following runs Silva adjusts the maximum stall day value until he 
extends it over the entire planning horizon. The results show that the optimization 
achieves the maximum value the longer ships are allowed to delay in a region. 
This ensures that the missions with the highest priorities get completely 
accomplished. 
B. NMP WITH LOGISTICS 
We will use Silva’s final scenario as the starting point for the analysis of 
the enhanced features added to NMP. The baseline run examines whether the 
optimized operational plan is valid without logistic support. In subsequent runs, 
we enable logistics to evaluate the enhanced features of NMP. We include a 
small force of CLF ships to see whether the operational plan found by the 
optimization is sustainable with CLF support. 
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Preliminary solutions during the test phase of NMP with logistics show that 
for this particular scenario DFM is the most crucial commodity. Therefore, we 
concentrate on the DFM inventory levels. We use the logistic consumption 
factors for phase 2 (Figure 1). Additionally, we make minor changes to the CMC 
matrix (Appendix C) because the legacy CMC sets restrict combatants, which 
causes other ships not to get assigned to deployment plans. We set the penalties 
for violating the safety level threshold to 0.00001 mission accomplishment units 
per barrel per day (DFM, JP5), and 0.001 units per short ton per day (STOR, 
ORDN), and subtract any such penalty  from the mission value. The penalty for 
violating the extremis value is 0.5 for all commodities and 1, if a ship runs out of 
any commodity. 
1. Initial Run 
For this run we use the settings from Silva’s fourth run as our initial set up 
(Silva, 2009, p.28 ff), and turn on the new logistics feature of NMP. The setup 
includes 15 surface combatants and three nuclear submarines.  We consider 80 
required missions spread all over the AOO, with 57 requiring accomplishment of 
one or more prerequisite missions. Table 3 shows an excerpt of the required 
missions. The initial run generates a small mixed integer program with that 15000 
variables of which about 12000 are binary, and about 3000 constraints. This 
instance solved in under 1 minute because we do not impose any logistic 
restriction to the model. 
We observe that the objective value is 3379.50; because the ongoing 
consumption of commodities without logistic support imposes penalties for each 
day any ship drops below the safety level threshold, or below extremis level, or 
runs out of a commodity. The first combatant depletes its entire DFM inventory 
by day 9, followed by other ships. This is illustrated in Figure 9, and shows that 
the operational plan found by the optimization is not sustainable without the 
support of CLF ships.  We account for these inventory alarms by penalizing our 
objective function, rather than declaring outright infeasibility, reasoning that it is 
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better to exhibit why this happens.  The penalized mission value objective is 
degraded to 1871.50 by these inventory violations. 
 
Figure 9 Initial Run Saw-tooth Diagram 
This saw-tooth diagram shows the daily consumption of DFM for each individual 
ship in a different color. We clearly observe, that 92% of the ships run out of DFM 
over the planning horizon, which indicates, that the operational plan is infeasible 
without logistic support. Some series overlay one another, and thus not all series 
are being displayed properly. 
 
2. Second Run – Include Logistic Support 
For this run, we include a small CLF force to support the surface 
combatants. The CLF force is composed of 3 fleet replenishment oilers (T-AO), 1 
fast combat supply ship (T-AOE), 3 combat stores ships (T-AFS), and 1 Modular 
dry cargo and ammunition ship (T-AKE). This represents a balanced mix of CLF 
ships enabling underway replenishment with all necessary commodities. The 
CLF ships are spread out over the AOO, accounting for regions that have ships 
assigned. We let the optimization determine the optimal deployment schedule for 
combatants and CLF ships. 
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We observe that the objective function mission value increases from 
1871.50 to 2259.81. This is a logical result from the utilization of the CLF ships, 
because now the optimization regularly schedules UNREP’s to supply the 
combatants. Figure 10 shows the saw-tooth diagram for DFM that clearly 
illustrates the use of the CLF ships. Appendix D shows and excerpt of the 
generated deployment plan for a CLF ship. 
 
Figure 10 Second Run Saw-tooth Diagram 
This shows the saw-tooth diagram of the daily consumption of DFM for each 
individual ship in a different color and activated CLF ships. We observe that 
some ships violate the safety level and one ship violates extremis level for one 
day. This shows the operational plan is sustainable with the activation of supply 
ships. 
 
3. Third Run – “Delivery Boy” Approach 
In this run, we examine the “delivery boy” approach. This features a given, 
fixed operational plan including the employment of combatants and required 
missions. Then we determine the optimal deployment schedule for CLF ships to 
support these fixed combatant employments.  We first use the optimization 
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without the logistic feature to find an optimized operational plan yielding the 
highest mission accomplishment objective function value. Then, we fix these 
combatant deployment plans, turn on the CLF feature, and use the model to 
determine the optimal deployment plans for the CLF ships to support the given 
operational plan.  
The mission accomplishment objective function value for this scenario is 
3271.35. The solve time is about 3 hours, which is acceptable in the planning 
phase of an operation, and can likely be improved by model refinements. The 
generated saw-tooth diagram (Figure 11) illustrates that ships drop below the 
safety level threshold, but do not fall below extremis level. 
 
Figure 11 Third Run Saw-tooth Diagram for “Delivery Boy” CLF Service 
This saw-tooth diagram shows the consumption of DFM for each ship in a 
different color. The “delivery boy” approach yields suitable deployment schedules 
for CLF ships ensuring sufficient support for combat ships. 
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4. Fourth Run – “Gas Station” Approach 
In the final run, we examine the “Gas Station” approach, where we fix CLF 
ships in prepositioned locations of the AOO. We manually create one deployment 
schedule for each CLF ship fixing her in one region for the entire planning 
horizon (we could also fix a CLF employment schedule to move region-to-region 
as we please). With CLF support activated, we then find deployment schedules 
for the combatants. 
The mission accomplishment objective value decreases to 3061.17, 
because now the combat ships need to seek a prepositioned CLF ship in order to 
get replenished. For example, DDG 53 cannot transit into an area where a CLF 
ship is prepositioned until day 8. This ship drops very low in DFM inventory, but 
gets resupplied in time. However, this shows that the optimized operational plan 
or the manual prepositioning of CLF ships may have to be adjusted. The 
following saw-tooth diagram (Figure 12) shows decreased replenishment 
opportunities due to the prepositioning of CLF ships, resulting in more ships 
dropping below the inventory threshold levels.  
Regarding the inventory levels of the CLF ships, we observe that given a 




Figure 12 Fourth Run Saw-tooth Diagram for “Gas Station” CLF Service. 
This saw-tooth diagram shows DFM inventory levels for each combat ship in a 
different color. With fixed, prepositioned CLF ships, we observe that multiple 
combatants drop below safety stock level and one ship drops below extremis 
level. Nevertheless, the operational plan found by the optimization is sustainable. 
 
5. Additional Insights 
When activated, the constraints enforcing the requirements of either 
ESCORT or CLOSE_ESCORT missions for shuttle ships impose such a 
significant restriction on the model that it significantly increases the runtime, and 
yields much lower quality solutions.  We have not been able to solve these more 
restrictive models to optimality for any instance.  However, when we review the 
results from prior runs of the model that do not require ESCORT for supply ships, 
we find that the solutions for many of these instances can satisfy these 
requirements, in the sense that every supply ship on every day of its optimal 
schedule is collocated with a combatant ship using CMCs that contain the 
ESCORT mission. 
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CLOSE_ESCORT turns out to be infeasible for the combatants and 
missions presented by Silva, and the CLF ships available.  This is not a criticism 
of Silva, but rather an observation that operational plans will need polishing to 
protect CLF ships when CLOSE_ESCORT is required.  That is, operational plans 
will have to be relaxed, or rescheduled, to render employments that can be 
supported by CLF ships. 
C. CONCLUSION 
1. Summary 
Maritime Commanders and their planning staffs dedicate a great amount 
of time planning maritime operations prior to force deployment. Thereby, it is 
necessary to address all important factors in the planning process, especially 
logistic requirements necessary to sustain operations for the anticipated planning 
horizon. We discuss two operational level decision aids to support maritime 
commanders. These decision aids enable evaluation of different courses of 
action in a short amount of time. Moreover, they allow for different planning 
approaches. While the CLF planner requires existing operational plans imported 
in the form of exogenous BG navigational tracks to find optimized employment 
schedules only for CLF ships, NMP addresses operational and logistic planning, 
and yields optimized employment schedules not only for CLF ships, but also for 
combatants. Furthermore, it may also evaluate fixed strategies for either 
combatants or supply ships. CLF solve times are about 5-10 minutes for the 
scenarios displayed, while NMP-CLF solve times can be much longer when we 
add CLF restrictions. These times vary with the complexity of the scenario, but 
are sufficient for timely analysis of multiple courses of action. 
2. Future Research 
a. Heuristic 
The NMP as well as the CLF planner use the general algebraic 
modeling language (GAMS) and the commercial solving algorithm CPLEX to 
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evaluate the optimization model and produce deployment schedules. GAMS is 
not available on standard Navy Marine Corps Internet (NMCI) computers, which 
restricts the use of the tool to specially-configured stand-alone personal 
computers. This obstructs the integration of these planners into planning cells 
such as Maritime Headquarters with maritime operation centers, and therefore 
the availability of these tools to planners. Furthermore, some of the solvers used, 
such as CPLEX, are proprietary with expensive individual user licenses (GAMS 
Development Corporation, 2009). Therefore, the development of a heuristic 
algorithm to solve the optimization model will provide availability for NMCI 
computers and improve the process of integrating these decision aids into the 
existing information technology infrastructure. 
b. Expanding the Horizon by Increasing Versatility 
The current release versions of NMP and CLF are populated with 
data for USN units only, and do not contain the necessary input for coalition 
forces such as NATO navies or coalition partners of opportunity. Because the 
consumption data for fuel, diesel fuel marine (DFM) as well as aviation fuel (JP5), 
stores, and ordnance are not easy to obtain through open sources, consumption 
data may be estimated depending on the ship’s characteristics such as size, 
propulsion system, warfare systems, etc., using USN combatants as analogies 
when applying the logistic planning factor equations to units from coalition navies 
(Miller, 1992, p. 138). Valuable information about characteristics can be obtained 
from unclassified publications such as Jane’s Fighting Ships (Jane's Information 
Group, 2009). Including coalition forces improves the versatility of both NMP and 
CLF, and opens opportunities to use the decision aids for a multinational 
coalition. This will contribute to the overall efficiency and effectiveness of 
maritime mission planning, and may also have a positive impact from an 
economic standpoint. 
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c. Include Land Component into the Planning Tool 
Today’s battlefield does not necessarily end at the shore of a 
country. In the joint world, many combatant commanders often are responsible 
for multiple warfare areas with multiple component commanders supporting the 
overall planning process. A decision aid incorporating operational and logistic 
planning function on the operational level may assist streamlining the process. 
Therefore, it may be beneficial to include the land component into the planning 
tool by developing a network presentation of the operation area ashore, where 
nodes represent operating regions, and arcs represent the shortest distance 
between adjacent regions. Certain nodes may be characterized as principle 
supply points allowing application of a network flow algorithm. This feature may 
also include some representation of Time-phased-Force and Deployment Data 
(TPFDD). 
d. Accommodate Delay of Dependent Missions 
For some planning scenarios, missions (or sets of missions) must 
be completed before other missions (or sets of missions) can be commenced.  
For lack of available combatants, it may be necessary to slip the entire 
operational plan to accommodate this. A slight generalization of the 
dependencies among missions can reflect that there are time dependencies that 
can be signaled by “phase completion” mission events.  Completion of such an 
event may have no objective value, per se, but would be prerequisite to 
commencing missions in the subsequent phase.  Each mission completion can 
either be expressed as “durable” or “temporary.”  A temporary mission must be 
completed every day during a phase of missions, while a durable one need be 
completed only once during the phase.  These relationships can all be expressed 
by prerequisite dependencies in the data.  
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APPENDIX A. CONSUMPTION FACTORS 
The following table shows the logistic consumption factors for each 
modeled ship type. The factors are displayed for each of the four main 
commodities, and summarized by the respective operational planning phase. 
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APPENDIX B. COMBAT MISSIONS 
The following table provides a list of maritime missions used in the NMP 
model that are common to maritime operations. 
Acronym Long Title Description 
AD Air Defense Defensive operations designed to engage enemy aircraft or missiles. 
TBMD Theatre Ballistic Missile Defense Operations against enemy missiles  
ASW Anti Submarine Warfare Operations to deny the enemy the effective use of its submarines. 
SUW Surface Warfare Operations conducted to destroy or neutralize enemy surface ships including merchants. 
STRIKE Strike Offensive operations to destroy enemy infrastructure or a capability. 
NSFS Naval Surface Fire Support 
Operations using naval gun and missile 
systems to support friendly units. 
MIO Maritime Interdiction Operation 
Operations to monitor, query, and board 
merchant traffic in international waters. 
MCM Mine Countermeasures Operations conducted to prevent danger and reduce damage originated from mines. 
MINE Mine Warfare 
Strategic, operational, and tactical use of mines 
in order to decrease the enemy’s operational 
versatility. 
INTEL Intelligence Collection Collection of information about foreign nations or hostile forces in areas of interest. 
SUBINTEL Submarine Intelligence Collection 
Intelligence collection in a covert manner that 
has to be conducted by a submarine. 
UNREP Underway Replenishment 
Operations to distribute commodities, or 
personnel between two or multiple ships at 
sea. 
ESCORT Escort 
Operations to ensure protection for high value 
units within a theater of operations with low 
risk. 
CLOSE_ESCORT Close Escort 
Operations to ensure protection for high value 
units within a theater of operations with high 
risk. 
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APPENDIX C. COMBINED MISSION CAPABILITY SET MATRIX 
The CMC matrix describes concurrent mission capabilities by ship type. 
The table shows the original CMC table embedded in the NMP graphical user 
interface. A definition of each mission included in each of the CMC and displayed 
in the first row of the following table can be found in Appendix B. 
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APPENDIX D. CLF SHIP EMPLOYMENT PLAN 
The following table shows an excerpt of the generated CLF employment 
plan for the “delivery boy” approach indicating on which day and in which region 
a CLF ship replenishes a combatant. Additionally, it shows the commodities, the 
amount transferred, and the inventory level of a CLF ship. 
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APPENDIX E. DISTANCE TABLE 
The following table shows the distances between the regions in the AOO 
in nautical miles. They represent the shortest great circle distance calculated with 
visual basic subroutines embedded in the graphical user interface. 
Region LON LAT Arcs Length(nm) 
r1 123 35 r1 r2 77.39280636 
r2 124 36 r1 r3 57.72718773 
r3 124 34.5 r2 r3 90.02854213 
r4 125 35 r2 r4 77.39280636 
r5 125 33.56 r2 r7 74.25004258 
r6 125.25 32 r3 r4 57.72718773 
r7 125.5 36.25 r3 r5 75.21262615 
r8 126.6 32.5 r4 r7 78.88936606 
r9 128 32.5 r4 r5 86.42740045 
r10 129 33.8 r5 r6 94.47561702 
r11 130 36 r5 r8 102.6105451 
r12 130.2 34.5 r6 r8 74.80783582 
r13 130 37.5 r8 r9 70.86683985 
r14 131.5 36 r9 r10 92.80463462 
r15 131.5 37.5 r10 r12 72.92193612 
r16 130 40 r11 r12 90.56058562 
rSasebo 129.5 33 r11 r13 90.02854213 
   r11 r14 72.83390191 
   r11 r15 115.3594323 
   r12 r14 110.2928619 
   r13 r14 115.3594323 
   r13 r15 71.42368869 
   r14 r15 90.02854213 
   r13 r16 150.0475702 
   r15 r16 165.6549877 
   rSasebo r9 81.44652121 
   rSasebo r10 54.1581819 
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